The Iran Deal and North Korea

Executive Summary

This paper explores the extent to which the lessons from the 1994 Agreed Framework between the US and North Korea can guide US policy toward Iran as it withdraws from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). It also examines whether lessons from US negotiation of the JCPOA can help to shape new strategies for denuclearizing the DPRK. While the US had similar motives for establishing and withdrawing from the Agreed Framework and the JCPOA, the quality of US relations with North Korea and Iran, key differences between the two agreements, and the diverging contexts of US withdrawal complicate the extent to which the former deal can provide lessons for the latter. Additionally, North Korea’s nuclear capabilities, its self-reliance, and the role of China challenge the extent to which the lessons from the JCPOA can inform US policy for denuclearizing North Korea.

Introduction

The US is currently embroiled in attempts to limit and control the nuclear programs in Iran and the North Korea. These negotiations help to ameliorate the risk, in the long run, that criminal or non-state actors obtain nuclear materials and address regional instability caused by the states’ nuclear programs.¹ As President Trump leaves the Iran Deal—dubbed the “worst deal ever”—this case offers a parallel to US withdrawal from another nuclear agreement, the Agreed Framework, in 1994.² It is important to understand the extent to which the tumultuous history and destabilizing consequences of US withdrawal from the latter deal can inform US policy toward Iran’s nuclear program vis-à-vis the JCPOA. Similarly, it is crucial to explore whether the model of the Iran Deal can be applied to North Korea as the US develops denuclearization strategies in the forthcoming US-DPRK summit. The first section of this paper provides an overview of US policy under the Agreed Framework and the JCPOA. The second section examines the extent to which US policy surrounding the Agreed Framework can serve as a model for US actions regarding the Iran Deal, presenting a scenario in which the US could apply policy lessons from the Agreed Framework’s collapse. The third section explores the implications of the JCPOA for US denuclearization strategies for North Korea.

Background

In 1994, the US and North Korea successfully negotiated the Agreed Framework, a deal which required North Korea to freeze its plutonium reprocessing, comply with IAEA inspections, take steps to implement the denuclearization agreement with South Korea, and remain in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). In exchange, the US promised to provide the country with light water reactors and annual heavy fuel oil shipments while moving toward an overall improvement in relations.³ The deal emerged from a period of severe tension in US-DPRK relations. A temporary agreement in 1992 halting North Korea’s nuclear weapons development in exchange for cancelling US joint military exercises resulted in a nuclear crisis, as North Korea failed to uphold its IAEA safeguards agreement and threatened to leave the NPT. Temporary deals between the US and North Korea collapsed as North Korea stalled in meeting its commitments, the US reinforced its regional military presence, and China blocked US attempts to pass UN sanctions on the DPRK. The Agreed Framework collapsed in 2002 when the US confronted North Korea over its covert uranium enrichment program. The US quickly halted its annual fuel oil shipments and suspended construction of the light water reactors, while North Korea expelled IAEA inspectors, withdrew from the NPT, and resumed nuclear activities. This collapse can be attributed to a “fundamental asymmetry” in how the two states perceived the deal—while the US viewed it primarily as a nonproliferation agreement, North Korea focused on its promises of diplomacy and engagement.⁴

The US made progress toward its goal of denuclearizing Iran following the election of a more moderate Iranian administration under Hassan Rouhani, in 2013. As Iran slowed uranium enrichment and took unilateral steps to limit plutonium production, substantive talks between Iran and the P5+1 paved the way for the JCPOA. Under this deal, Iran dramatically reduced its enrichment capability and uranium stockpile, accepted significant restrictions on its Arak reactor, and complied with extensive IAEA monitoring and verification. The P5+1 nations, in return, agreed to remove all nuclear-related international sanctions according to a clear timeline, with a mechanism for “snapback” re-imposition in case of violation.⁵ President Trump decertified Iran’s compliance in Jan. 2018 and pulled out of the deal in May, citing frustration with the deal’s limited scope and phasing out of nuclear restrictions. The decision to withdraw has created a diplomatic impasse that disrupts progress toward US priority of Iranian denuclearization. Finally, the recent resumption of high-level engagement between the US and North Korea after a year of hostilities and vigorous nuclear development by the DPRK opens the possibility of a comprehensive denuclearization agreement between the nations.⁶

The Agreed Framework and the JCPOA

Key differences between the contexts of the Agreed Framework and the JCPOA—particularly positive engagement with a more moderate Iran, the strength of JCPOA enforcement mechanisms, and international pressure opposing US withdrawal—prevent direct application of the lessons from the former deal to the latter. However, if Iran were to expand enrichment activities or resume reprocessing of spent fuel, the US should follow the lessons from the Agreed Framework’s failure and support a response from within the JCPOA’s dispute resolution structure.

US relations with Iran leading up to the JCPOA were much more conducive to positive engagement than those with North Korea immediately prior to the Agreed Framework. The 1994 deal arose from an 18-month nuclear crisis, in which North Korea failed to comply with its commitments under the IAEA safeguards agreement and NPT. The US re-instated joint military exercises with South Korea and began “reinforcing its regional military posture.” ⁷ The hostile state of relations created a sense of urgency that made it more difficult for the US to gain meaningful concessions from North Korea. In contrast, the JCPOA emerged from a two-year period of steady negotiations between the P5+1 nations and Iran; after the election of the more moderate President Rouhani in 2013, Iran approached negotiations “with candor” and complied with its obligations under interim deals.⁸

At a textual level, the JCPOA establishes more effective mechanisms for verifying and ensuring state compliance. The intrusive regime of IAEA inspections, monitoring, and verification nearly eliminates the possibility that Iran can pursue nuclear weapons covertly; the mechanism for re-imposition of sanctions dramatically and immediately raises the costs for Iran of treaty violation. In contrast, under the Agreed Framework, definitive US intelligence on a covert North Korean enrichment program arose in 2001, several years after the program was thought to have begun. The lack of clear enforcement mechanisms meant the US only began to take punitive measures against the enrichment program in 2002.⁹

Moreover, the international context for US withdrawal from each deal varied significantly. When President Trump withdrew from the JCPOA in May, the multilateral structure of the deal meant he faced pressure from allied P5+1 states to remain in the deal. International pressure was exacerbated by repeated IAEA reports that Iran was in compliance with its treaty commitments, contradicting President Trump’s claims that there was “definitive proof” Iran was not interested in limiting its nuclear activity to peaceful purpose.¹⁰ In contrast, the Agreed Framework operated on a bilateral basis between the US and North Korea. US-led KEDO (Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization) also framed its 2002 suspension of heavy-fuel oil deliveries to North Korea as a response to the country’s covert uranium enrichment program.  Although such a program was not explicitly addressed in the 1994 agreement, it violated the 1992 Joint Declaration that Pyongyang had pledged to uphold, providing a basis for the US’s withdrawal from its own commitments.

However, if Iran pursues further plutonium reprocessing or expands its enrichment program, the US should draw from the failures of the Agreed Framework and support a collective, strategic response from within the JCPOA’s structure. The Bush administration responded to North Korea’s enrichment by directly confronting the country; during a visit intended for comprehensive policy discussions, Secretary Kelly made clear that “US intelligence findings preclude any possible forward movement in US-North Korean relations.” ¹¹ The US also abandoned the progress made under the 1994 accord, claiming the Agreed Framework “as we know it is dead” and suspending heavy oil deliveries based on consultations with South Korea and Japan. In the case of Iranian violations, US experience with North Korea suggests it should leave open the route to diplomacy as a means to peacefully bring Iran back into compliance with JCPOA conditions.¹² The US should also support an international response from within the structure of the JCPOA, ensuring immediate dialogue for conflict resolution with an established framework. The Iran Deal establishes a joint dispute resolution mechanism under which the JCPOA parties have 35 days to resolve the violation, after which the complaining party is authorized to stop abiding by its own commitments. If the joint mechanism fails to bring Iran back into compliance, the US should coordinate with the P5+1 nations still in the deal to ensure re-imposition of sanctions has the desired effect—freezing potential weaponization of Iran’s nuclear program and bringing the country back to the negotiating table. While the US under President Trump is unlikely to re-join the JCPOA, it is crucial that the US respect the institutions currently restricting Iran’s pursuit of nuclear weapons.

The JCPOA and North Korea Denuclearization Strategies

Fundamental differences between Iran in 2015 and North Korea today prevent smooth application of the lessons from the JCPOA to current strategies to denuclearize North Korea. While the Iran Deal provides a possible model for structured dismantlement of the latter’s nuclear weapons, North Korea’s nuclear capabilities and self-reliance, uncertain relations with the US, and the role of China challenge the extent to which the deal can guide US North Korea policy.

The JCPOA model has limited applicability for the North Korea case as the DPRK already possesses significant nuclear weapons capability, relative to Iran’s limited program prior to the JCPOA. IAEA investigations into Iran’s nuclear program found the country had attempted to indigenously produce fissile material through 2009, but had not produced a nuclear bomb by the time of JCPOA negotiations.¹³ In contrast, North Korea, a non-party to the NPT, has tested six nuclear weapons over the course of its nuclear program. IAEA estimates suggest North Korea possesses 10-20 nuclear warheads and enough fissile material to produce 30-60 nuclear bombs.¹⁴ Any deal with North Korea must therefore seek to dismantle its advanced nuclear infrastructure and prevent it from renewing production of nuclear weapons, rather than blocking the country from acquiring this capability.

North Korea’s doctrine of self-reliance makes it less susceptible than Iran to the impact of international sanctions. President Rouhani’s desire to “normalize relations with Iran’s regional neighbors and the world powers” and invite foreign investment for economic progress meant he was willing to accept strong restrictions on Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for relief from economically-isolating sanctions.¹⁵ In contrast, North Korea’s prioritization of economic and political self-sufficiency has allowed it to withstand international sanctions; while Kim Jong Un has called for more independent “socialist enterprise management methods,” experts debate the North Korean leadership’s true commitment to economic opening.¹⁶

The volatility of current US-North Korean relations challenges the extent to which the US can implement a JCPOA-like agreement with a strict timeline and clear responsibilities for both sides. Both President Trump and Kim Jong Un have demonstrated unprecedented inconsistency in their negotiations for a US-DPRK summit; President Trump’s recent letter cancelling the bilateral summit and his subsequent openness to resuming summit preparations exemplify the uncertainty that has prevailed in recent bilateral relations. The lack of policy consistency on the part of both leaders makes it difficult for either side to credibly commit to abide by specific nuclear restrictions or waive sanctions. As the JCPOA’s quid pro quo structure of accepting nuclear restrictions in exchange for lifting sanctions rely on long-term cooperation, the current state of bilateral relations provides an uncertain context for implementation of a JCPOA-like treaty.

Finally, China’s presence as an influential regional player reinforces the divergence between the JCPOA and current moves to denuclearize North Korea. Though China is interested in North Korea’s denuclearization, it has historically opposed sanctions and other international measures that threaten the stability of the regime. Concerns about US-China relations discouraged the US from imposing sweeping secondary sanctions on global banks handling transactions with North Korea, a measure it took to bring Iran to negotiations for the JCPOA.¹⁷ Moreover, even when China does comply with international sanctions, it is motivated by ulterior desires to reassert control over the regime, rather than alignment of interest with the international community.¹⁸ The need to address China’s concerns introduces an additional constraint on US policy actions that limits the extent to which US policymakers can demand concessions similar to those extracted under the Iran Deal.

Conclusion

While the US has sought comprehensive agreements to denuclearize Iran and North Korea, particularly in 1994 (the Agreed Framework), 2015 (the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action), and 2018 (US-DPRK summit), underlying divergences among the cases complicate the extent to which lessons from the cases can inform each other. Compared to the context and terms of the 1994 Agreed Framework, US-Iran cooperation prior to the JCPOA was more substantive, and the deal established stronger mechanisms for enforcing compliance while exerting greater international pressure on the US to maintain its treaty commitments. Similarly, North Korea’s advanced nuclear capabilities and self-reliance, the volatility of US-DPRK relations, and the role of China complicate the extent to which the Iran Deal can guide North Korea’s denuclearization. Moving forward, if Iran breaches restrictions on its nuclear program, it is crucial that the US not repeat its mistakes in the Agreed Framework by leaving open channels for diplomacy and coordinating a response that preserves the framework of the JCPOA.

 

Citations

¹ Fearon, James D. “The Nuclear Revolution, International Politics, and US Foreign Policy,” Sept. 2016.

² Sanger, David E, Steven Erlanger. “Trump is expected to leave Iran Deal, Allies Say,” The NY Times, May 7, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/07/us/politics/trump-announce-withdraw-us-iran-deal.html.

³ US-DPRK Agreed Framework / Six-Party Talks. Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Oct. 21, 1994, http://www.nti.org/media/pdfs/aptagframe.pdf.

⁴ Narang, Vipin and Nicholas Miller. “North Korea Defied the Theoretical Odds: What can we learn from its successful nuclearization?” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, March 19, 2018, https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/03/19/north-korea-defied-theoretical-odds-what-can-we-learn-from-its-successful-nuclearization-pub-75834.

⁵ “The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action at a Glance,” Arms Control Association, May 2018, https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/JCPOA-at-a-glance.

⁶ Calamur, Krishnadev. “Two Nuclear Deals, Two Countries, Three Decades Apart,” The Atlantic, Oct. 12, 2017, https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/10/iran-northk-korea-nuclear/542673/.

⁷ Narang, Vipin and Nicholas Miller. “North Korea Defied the Theoretical Odds: What can we learn from its successful nuclearization?” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.

⁸ “Timeline of Nuclear Diplomacy with Iran,” Arms Control Association, May 2018, https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheet/Timeline-of-Nuclear-Diplomacy-With-Iran.

⁹ Pollack, Jonathan D. “The United States, North Korea, and the end of the Agreed Framework,” US Naval War College, March 26, 2003, http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a525711.pdf.

¹⁰ Rizzo, Salvador and Meg Kelly. “Fact-checking President Trump’s reasons for leaving the Iran nuclear deal,” The Washington Post, May 9, 2018, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/fact-checker/wp/2018/05/09/fact-checking-president-trumps-reasons-for-leaving-the-iran-nuclear-deal/?utm_term=.c9920204fd49.

¹¹ Pollack, Jonathan D. “The United States, North Korea, and the end of the Agreed Framework,” US Naval War College.

¹² Pollack, Jonathan D. “The United States, North Korea, and the end of the Agreed Framework,” US Naval War College.

¹³ “Nuclear Weapons: Who has what at a glance,” Arms Control Association, https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Nuclearweaponswhohaswhat.

¹⁴ “Nuclear Weapons: Who has what at a glance,” Arms Control Association.

¹⁵ Alireza Nader et al. “Iranian Domestic Challenges to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action,” RAND Corporation, 2017, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/PE200/PE218/RAND_PE218.pdf.

¹⁶ Snyder, Scott A. “The Motivations Behind North Korea’s Pursuit of Simultaneous Economic and Nuclear Development,” Council on Foreign Relations, Nov. 20, 2013, https://www.cfr.org/blog/motivations-behind-north-koreas-pursuit-simultaneous-economic-and-nuclear-development.

¹⁷ De Luce, Dan. “US Weighs Iran-Style Sanctions on North Korea. Risking a Rift with China,” Foreign Policy, Oct 6, 2016, http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/10/06/u-s-weighs-iran-style-sanctions-on-north-korea-risking-a-rift-with-china/.

¹⁸ Ramani, Samuel. “China’s Approach to North Korea Sanctions,” The Diplomat, Jan. 10, 2018, https://thediplomat.com/2018/01/chinas-approach-to-north-korea-sanctions/.